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The phenomenon of foreign fighters in Libya

The phenomenon of foreign fighters in Libya

In 2011, a revolution erupted in Libya to overthrow the Qaddafi regime (Winer, 2019). Since then, Libya has experienced a massive influx of foreign fighters. According to the UN, there are 20,000 foreign fighters in Libya, which constitute a real threat not only to the Libyan sovereignty but also to the safety of civilians (UN News, 2020). Besides that, the massive existence of foreign fights impedes the institutional functionality of the Libyan state, as it keeps the armed conflict on fire.

Terrorist organizations are well known for their abilities to attract foreign fighters, e.g., ISIS in Libya managed to attract fighters from Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and other regional countries. Reports indicated that ISIS had about 5,000 fighters by 2016, which gave it an advantage to wage deadly attacks against civilians in Libya (Al Arabia, 2016).

The massive influx of foreign fighters to Libya came as a result of ISIS’s attempt to make Libya its new base in the Middle East after being defeated in Syria and Iraq by the Global Coalition against Daesh (Trew, 2017). However, the main conflictual parties in Libya (the Tripoli-based government of the National Accord and the Tobruk-based government) took responsibilities to fight the Libyan branch of ISIS. The main conflictual sides sought to take credit through defeating ISIS in Libya as a method to increase their legitimacy on the ground. For instance, the UN-backed government defeated ISIS and regained control over the coastal city of Sirte in 2016 (Eljarh, 2016). Also, the forces of the Libyan National Army (LNA) fought against ISIS in the southern parts of Libya (The Arab weekly, 2019). By 2020, ISIS lost most of the lands it controlled, and its fighters became scattered all over the southern parts of the country, which is not inhabited (Chughtai & Allahoum, 2020).

Both the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the LNA attempted to introduce themselves to the west as the most reliable ally in Libya. For instance, the LNA appealed to France by focusing on fighting the terrorist organizations in the eastern parties of Libya (Mezran, 2020). The GNA sought to intensify its relations with Italy by adopting anti-migration agenda (Megerisi & Varvelli, 2020). The UN’s failure to enforce the arms embargo on Libya was the main reason that pushed the Libyan parties towards Europe (Kaim & Schulz, 2020).

The phenomenon of foreign fighters in Libya is not limited to terrorist organizations, as the Libyan National Army (LNA) recruited thousands of African mercenaries to fight on the front lines against the UN-recognized government which is based in Tripoli. By December 2019, 3,000 Sudanese mercenaries were fighting alongside the LNA to overthrow the GNA in Tripoli (Burke & Salih, 2019). In July 2020, the Sudanese government arrested 160 mercenaries on borders while being on their way to Libya to fight for the LNA (Assad, 2020).

To ensure Russian support, the LNA recruited a Russian mercenary group, known as Wagner. The Wagner involvement in Libya began in 2018, when the LNA decided to regain control over Tripoli from the GNA. According to the UN, by 2018, Russia deployed 1200 of its mercenary group in Libya to assist the LNA in capturing Tripoli (Al Jazeera, 2020). Wagner group provided the LNA with technical and logistical support, which enabled the army to achieve progress against the GNA’s forces, when it began to fight on the front lines (BBC, 2020).

The role of Syrian fighters in Libya has been prominent the last two years, as both the GNA and the LNA recruited Syrian mercenaries. After the Turkish intervention in Libya for the GNA, the Russian drive to recruit fighters for the LNA accelerated. Fighters were sent from Syria to assist the LNA in its war against the GNA (Reuters, 2020).

As the crisis of foreign fighters poses a real threat to the entire world, many European countries act actively to end it. For instance, Germany brought the main actors in the war into the Berlin conference in 2020 to convince them to sign a ceasefire agreement. Besides that, the Berlin conference insisted on the participant parties not to violate the arms embargo imposed by the UN since 2012 (Security Council Report, 2020).

Article by
Ahmed Sami Abdelfattah Abouyoussef


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